The course will be divided into two parts. In the first part of the course, we will be discussing questions in the philosophy of mind. The plan is to use two anti-physicalist arguments as a starting point, Frank Jackson’s knowledge argument and David Chalmers' zombie argument, and look at some prominent responses on behalf of physicalism. In the second part of the course, we will be discussing possible worlds and the metaphysics of modality. The plan is to focus on David Lewis’ modal realism. The only book you will need to get is David Lewis’ On the Plurality of Worlds. It will be the main text for the second part of the course. It is available at Akademika. Everything else on the list will be made available. If an electronic copy is not available, a master copy will be made available at the IFIKK front office. When you have copied the material you need, please bring everything back as soon as possible.
Ball, D. (2009). There Are No Phenomenal Concepts. Mind, 118, 935-962.
Balog, K. (2009). Phenomenal Concepts. In B. McLaughlin (Ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind (p. 292-312). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Chalmers, D. (1996). The Conscious Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (excerpts)
Dennett, D. (1995). The Unimagined Preposterousness of Zombies. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 2, 322-326.
Dennett, D. (2007). What RoboMary Knows. In T. Alter & S. Walter (Eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge (p. 15-31). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Jackson, F. (1982). Epiphenomenal Qualia. Philosophical Quarterly, 32, 127-136.
Jackson, F. (1986). What Mary Didn’t Know. Journal of Philosophy, 83, 291-295.
Lewis, D. (1986). On the Plurality of Worlds. Oxford: Blackwell.
Loar, B. (1997). Phenomenal States. In N. Block, O. Flanagan, & G. Güzeldere (Eds.), Minds and Persons (p. 597-616). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Reprinted in Chalmers (2002, p. 295-311))
Tidman, P. (1994). Conceivability as a Test for Possibility. American Philosophical Quarterly, 31, 297-309.
Worley, S. (2003). Conceivability, Possibility and Physicalism. Analysis, 63, 15-23.
Yablo, S. (1993). Is Conceivability a Guide to Possibility? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 53, 1-42.