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Introductory text book:
Stout, Rowland (2005), Action, Chesham: Acumen. (158 s.) (Book recommended bought, Akademika)
Monograph:
Anscombe, Elizabeth (1957), Intention, Oxford: Blackwell. (94 s). (Book recommended bought, Akademika)
Papers and book chapters:
Bratman, Michael (1993), “Shared Intention”, Ethics, Vol. 104, pp. 97–113. (16 s.)
Bratman, Michael (2000), “Reflection, Planning, and Temporally Extended Agency”, Philosophical Review, Vol. 109, pp. 35-61. (34 s.) [Also in M. Bratman, Structures of Agency, Oxford: Oxford University Press (2007).]
Davidson, Donald (1980), “Action, Reasons and Causes”, “Agency”, “Intending”, “How is Weakness of the Will Possible?”, In D. Davidson, Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford University Press. (75 s.) (Book recommended bought, Akademika)
Fitzpatrick, William (2004), “Reasons, Value, and Particular Agents”, Mind, Vol. 113, pp. 285–318. (33 s.)
Foot, Philippa (1972), “Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives”, Philosophical Review, Vol. 81, pp. 305–316. (11 s.) [Also in P. Foot, Virtues and Vices and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy, Oxford: Blackwell (1978).] Gilbert, Margaret (2009), “Shared Intention and Personal Intentions”, Philosophical Studies, Vol. 144, pp. 167–187. (20 s.)
Frankfurt, Harry (1988). “The Problem of Action”, “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person”, “Identification and Externality”, “Identification and Wholeheartedness”, In H. Frankfurt, The Importance of What We Care About, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (55 s.) (Book recommended bought, Akademika)
Korsgaard, Christine (1986), “Skepticism about Practical Reason”, Journal of Philosophy, Vol. LXXXIII, pp. 5– 25. (20 s.)
Markovits, Julia (2011), “Why be an Internalist about Reasons?”, In R. Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Vol. 6, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 255–279. (26 s.)
Smith, Michael (1997), “Internal Reasons”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. LV, pp. 109– 131. (22 s.)
Velleman, David (1992), “What Happens When Someone Acts?”, Mind, Vol. 101, pp. 461–481. (20 s.) [Also in D. Velleman, The Possibility of Practical Reason, Oxford: Clarendon (2000).]
Velleman, David (1996), “The Possibility of Practical Reason”, Ethics, Vol. 106, pp. 694–726. (32 s.) [Also in D. Velleman, The Possibility of Practical Reason, Oxford: Clarendon (2000).]
Watson, Gary (1975), “Free Agency”, Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 72, pp. 205–220 (15 s.) [Also in G. Watson (ed.), Fee Will, Oxford: Oxford University Press (1982 and later).]
Compendium:
Gert, Joshua (2000), “Practical Rationality, Morality, and Purely Justificatory Reasons”, American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 37, pp. 227–243. (16 s.)
Hornsby, Jennifer (1980), Ch. 1. “Actions and Bodily Movements”, Ch. 2. “Bodily Movements and Muscle Contractions”, Ch. 3 “Acting and Trying to Act”, in Action, London: Kegan Paul (appendixes to Ch. 1 and Ch. 2 are excluded). (38 s.)
McDowell, John (1995), “Might there be External Reasons?”, In J.E.J. Altham and R. Harrison (eds.) World, Mind, and Ethics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 68–85. (17 s.)
Williams, Bernard (1981), “Internal and External Reasons”, In B. Williams, Moral Luck, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 101–113. (12 s.)