Textbook:
Clark, William Roberts, Matt Golder and Sona Nadenichek Golder. 2012. Principles of Comparative Politics. 2nd Edition. Washington D.C.: CQ Press; chapters 1, 3-6, 9-13, and 15-16.
Approx. 500 pages (Further specifications on parts of the abovementioned chapters that may be read cursorily or even dropped will be provided on Fronter.)
Articles:
Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson and James A. Robinson. 2002. “Reversal of Fortune: Geography and Institutions in the Making of the Modern World Income Distribution.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 107(4): 1231-1294.
Link: http://qje.oxfordjournals.org/content/117/4/1231.full.pdf
Baum, Matthew A. and David A. Lake. 2003. “The Political Economy of Growth: Democracy and Human Capital.” American Journal of Political Science 47(2):333–347.
Link: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3186142
Boix, Carles and Susan C. Stokes. 2003. “Endogenous Democratization.” World Politics 55(4):517–549.
Link: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25054237
Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce. 2007. “Leopold II and the Selectorate: An Account in Contrast to a Racial Explanation.” Historical Social Research 32(4): 203-221.
Link: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20762247
Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, James D. Morrow, Randolph M. Siverson, Alastair Smith. 1999. “Policy Failure and Political Survival: The Contribution of Political Institutions.” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 43(2):147-161.
Link: http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/174273.pdf?acceptTC=true
De Long, Bradford and Andrei Shleifer. 1993. “Princes and Merchants: European City Growth Before the Industrial Revolution.” Journal of Law and Economics 36(2):671–702.
Link: http://www.jstor.org/stable/i229114
Evans, Peter B. and James E. Rauch. 1999. “Bureaucracy and Growth: A Cross-National Analysis of the Effects of ‘Weberian’ State Structures on Economic Growth.” American Sociological Review 64(5):748–765.
Link: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2657374?origin=JSTOR-pdf
Geddes, Barbara. 1999. “What do we know about democratization after twenty years?” Annual Review of Political Science 2:115-144.
Link: http://www.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev.polisci.2.1.115
Hall, Peter A. and Daniel W. Gingerich. 2009. “Varieties of Capitalism and Institutional Complementarities in the Political Economy: An Empirical Analysis”. British Journal of Political Science 39(3): 449-482.
Houle, Christian. 2009. “Inequality and Democracy: Why Inequality Harms Consolidation but Does Not Affect Democratization.” World Politics 61(4):589–622.
Link: http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=6095608
Kennedy, Ryan. 2010. “The Contradiction of Modernization: A Conditional Model of Endogenous Democratization” Journal of Politics 72(3):785-798.
Knutsen, Carl Henrik. 2011. “Which Democracies Prosper? Electoral Rules, Form of Government and Economic Growth.” Electoral Studies 30(1):83–90.
Link:http://www.sv.uio.no/isv/forskning/publikasjoner/artikler/chknutsen_sciencedirect_2011.pdf
Nickell, Stephen. 1997. “Unemployment and Labor Market Rigidities: Europe versus North America”. Journal of Economic Perspectives 11(3):55-74.
Link: http://web.pdx.edu/~ito/NickellJEP1997.pdf
North, Douglass C. and Barry R. Weingast. 1989. “Constitutions and Commitment: The Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth Century England.” Journal of Economic History 44(4):803–832.
Link: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2122739
Persson, Torsten and Guido Tabellini. 2004. “Constitutions and Economic Policy.” The Journal of Economic Perspectives 18(1):75–98.
Link: http://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1257/089533004773563449
Powell, Jonathan. 2012. “Determinants of the Attempting and Outcome of Coups d'état.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 56 (6): 1017-1040.
Przeworski, Adam and Fernando Limongi. 1997. “Modernization: Theory and Facts.” World Politics 49(2):155–183.
Link: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25053996
Wintrobe, Ronald. 2001. “How to understand, and deal with dictatorship: an economist’s view.” Economics of Governance 2:35-58.
Approx. 465 pages (Further specifications will be given on which articles to read cursorily and which to read thoroughly.)
Total pages: Approx. 960