Under task A, answer briefly FIVE of the seven questions. Under task B, answer EITHER question 8 OR question 9.
Task A (40%)
1. How does a club good differ from a common-pool resource? Furthermore, how does a club good differ from a pure public good?
Answer: A club good is excludable and non-rival (up to a point). In contrast, a common-pool resource is non-excludable and rival, while a pure public good is non-excludable and non-rival.
2. How do deep and shallow commitments differ?
Answer: A shallow commitment does not require behavioral change; thus, it permits a country to continue business as usual and is therefore not costly to comply with. In contrast, a deep commitment requires behavioral change (e.g., in the form of new legislation or policies that would not have been adopted otherwise). Hence, a deep commitment requires a deviation from BAU and is therefore costly to comply with.
3. Describe two different ways of measuring regime effectiveness.
Answer: The course covers three ways of measuring regime effectiveness. The first is the Oslo-Potsdam solution, which offers a simple formula that varies (roughly) between 0 (zero effectiveness) and 1 (perfect problem solving). The formula is E = (AP-NR)/(CO-NR), where E = effectiveness, NR = no-regime counterfactual, and CO = collective optimum.
The second way is Oran Young’s distinction between output, outcome, and impact. Finally, the third way is Scott Barrett’s three conditions for effectiveness: Broad participation, deep commitments, and high compliance.
4. What is the (collective) purpose of international environmental agreements?
Answer: The rationalist (incentive-based) view is that IEAs (should) aim to restructure the incentives of the participating countries, thereby enabling them to achieve a Pareto-optimal outcome (or at least a Pareto improvement compared to the outcome without an agreement). For example, such restructuring might take the form of a potent enforcement system. In contrast, the norm-based view is that the main role of IEAs is to build strong and environmentally friendly norms and to enable such norms to be sustained by naming and shaming. The norms-based view holds that efforts to provide enforcement largely constitute a waste of time.
5. Name at least one upside and one downside of choosing a top-down design for an international climate agreement.
Answer: An upside is that the agreement will be rooted in science and that the parties’ commitments may therefore be expected (at least in principle) to add up to what is required to solve the underlying problem. Another upside is that the commitments will be negotiated jointly by the parties, thereby requiring the consent of all parties concerning burden sharing. A downside is that a top-down design may be unable to fully exploit local knowledge about what each country is able and willing to do.
6. How do the multilateralist and unilateralist views on climate action differ?
Answer: The multilateralist view holds that climate change constitutes a collective action problem, requiring inter-state cooperation based on reciprocity. In contrast, the unilateralist view contends that in almost all countries a large majority supports ambitious climate action regardless of what other countries do. Hence, inter-state cooperation is less important than argued by the multilateralist view.
7. Describe the life cycle of a norm.
Answer: The number of stages in a norm’s life cycle varies somewhat across different scholarly contributions. However, a good answer should include (at least some of) the following stages: 1. A norm emerges, supported by norm entrepreneurs. 2. The norm gains a foothold. 3.The norm reaches a tipping point. 4. The norm cascades. 5. The norm becomes internalized. 6. The norm “dies” (and is replaced by another norm).
Task B (60%)
8. Discuss the potential role that potent enforcement measures might serve in an international environmental agreement (IEA). Then explain why such measures are rare in IEAs. Finally, explain why compliance rates in IEAs are often high despite the absence of potent enforcement measures.
Answer: A good answer should point out that potent enforcement measures might deter free riding, whether in the form of nonparticipation (participation enforcement) or in the form of noncompliance (compliance enforcement). Potent enforcement is rare because countries expecting to be hurt by enforcement will likely object to including potent enforcement measures in the agreement. Finally, the high observed compliance rates in IEAs are explained differently by the enforcement school and the management school. The former school argues that they are due to a selection effect, that is, most IEAs are shallow, meaning that compliance with existing IEAs is largely cost free. In contrast, the latter school contends that states have a “natural tendency” to comply, due to efficiency concerns, regime norms, and national interests (including reputation effects).
9. The UNFCCC negotiations are often criticized for slow progress. What might explain this slow progress? Climate clubs and transnational environmental governance have been proposed as alternative (or complementary) avenues for ambitious climate action. Which of these two avenues (if any) do you find more promising? Explain your answer.
Answer: The slow progress in the UNFCCC can be explained with reference to the consensus rule, which at least in principle provides each member country with a veto. The result is that the so-called Law of the least ambitious program prevails. In part two, a good answer would start by defining the two core concepts. Of course, there is no single-best answer to which avenue is most promising; hence, either conclusion should be accepted provided it is well argued. The best students will likely point out some similarities between the two avenues (bottom up, starting in small groups) as well as some differences (countries versus cities/municipalities, use of incentives versus reliance on norm building).