STV4217B - Spring 2020

Syllabus/achievement requirements

Texts in compendium are available here (you have to log in to get access).

Collier, Paul (2000): ‘Doing Well Out of War: An Economic Perspective', in Mats Berdal & David M. Malone, eds, Greed & Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. 91–111. (21p)

Dixit, A. & S. Skeath (1999): Games of Strategy, New York: W.W. Norton Kap. 2-3 (60p)

Ellsberg, D. (1975): "The Theory and Practice of Blackmail", ss.343-363 in O. R. Young (red.), Bargaining. Formal Theories of Negotiation. Urbana: University of Illinois Press. (21p)

Elster, J. (1986): "Introduction", ss. 1-33 i J. Elster (red.): Rational Choice, Oxford: Blackwell. (33p)

Fink, E. C., S. Gates & B. D. Humes (1998): Game Theory Topics: Incomplete Information, Repeated Games, and N-player Games, Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage. kap 1. (6p)

Gibbons, Robert (1992). A Primer in Game Theory. New York etc.: Harvester Wheatsheaf. pp. 1-21. (20p)

Harsanyi, J. (1986): "Advances in Understanding Rational Behavior", ss. 82-108 i J. Elster ( ed.): Rational Choice, Oxford: Blackwell. (27 p)

Hovi, J. (1998): Games, Threats and Treaties. Understanding Commitments in International Relations, London: Pinter. Kap. 1-4. (73 p)

Morrow, J. D. (1994): Game Theory for Political Scientists, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. Chap. 6. (27 p)

Powell, R. (1990): Nuclear Deterrence Theory. The Search for Credibility, New York: Cambridge University Press. Ch. 1-2. ( 32 p)

Schelling, T. C. (1980/1960): The Strategy of Conflict, New York: Harvard University Press. Chap. 8. (16 p)

Online articles

You can search the articles and e-books in the e-journal database available at the University of Oslo Library. This requires having access to and being logged onto the UiO system. Contact the Library Services for Humanities and Social Science if you have problems finding the literature.

Butler, C., & Gates, S. (2009). Asymmetry, parity, and (civil) war: Can international theories of power help us understand civil war?. International Interactions 35:3: 330-340.

Fearon, J. (1995): "Rationalist Explanations of War", International Organization 379-414. (35 s.)

Fearon, James D. (2004): `Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer Than Others?', Journal of Peace Research 41(3). 275--302.

Fink, E. C., S. Gates & B. D. Humes (1998): Game Theory Topics: Incomplete Information, Repeated Games, and N-player Games, Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage. (available via Canvas)

Gartzke, E. (1999): "War Is in the Error Term", International Organization 53. s. 567-587. (21 s.)

Gibbons, R. (1997): "An Introduction to Applicable Game Theory", Journal of Economic Perspectives 11. s. 127-149. (23 s.)

Hovi, J., R. Huseby & D. Sprinz (2005): "When Do (Imposed) Economic Sanctions Work?", World Politics 57(4): 479-499. (25p)

Kahl, C. H. & K. N. Waltz (2012). Iran and the Bomb. Would a Nuclear Iran Make the Middle East More Secure?, Foreign Affairs 91 (3). (3s.)

Kalyvas, S. N., & Balcells, L. (2010). International system and technologies of rebellion: How the end of the Cold War shaped internal conflict. American Political Science Review, 104(3): 415-429.

Kydd, A. & B. F. Walter (2002): "Sabotaging the Peace: The Politics of Extremist Violence", International Organization 56(2):263-296 (34p.)

Pape, R. A. (1997): “Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work”, International Security 22. s. 90-136. (47 p.).

Pape, Robert A. (2003): "The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism", American Political Science Review 97(3). 343–361 (19p).

Sandler, Todd & Daniel G. Arce (2003): "Keynote Paper: Terrorism & Game Theory", Simulation and Gaming 34(3). 319–337.

Waltz, Kenneth N. (2012). "Why Iran Should Get the Bomb: Nuclear Balancing Would Mean Stability", Foreign Affairs 91 (2): 2-5.

Watson, Joel. 2008. Strategy: An Introduction to Game Theory. W.W. Norton & Company: New York. 2^nd edition, Chapter 19. (available via Canvas)

Weiss, T.G. (1999): “Sanctions as a Foreign Policy Tool”, Journal of Peace Research 36. p. 499-509. (11 p.).

Werner, Suzanne & Amy Yuen (2005): "Making and Keeping Peace", International Organization 59 (Spring). 261–292.

Total required reading: ca. 862 pages

Recommended (non-compulsory) Reading

This literature is not part of the required reading. The purpose of the recommended reading is to broaden and deepen the understanding of the subjects addressed in the course.

Achen, C. H. & D. Snidal (1989): "Rational Deterrence and Comparative Case Studies", World Politics 41. s. 143-69.

Azam, Jean-Paul (2005): "Suicide-Bombing as Inter-Generational Investment", Public Choice 122(1) . 177–198.

Baldwin, D.A. (1999): "The Sanctions Debate and the Logic of Choice", International Security 24. s. 80-107. (28p).

Binmore, K. (1987): "Modelling Rational Players Part I", Economics and Philosophy 3. s. 179-214.

Binmore, K. (1988): "Modelling Rational Players Part II", Economics and Philosophy 4. 9 55.

Blaydes, Lisa. (2004). “Rewarding Impatience. A Bargaining and enforcement Model of OPEC,” International Organization 58(2): 213 – 237.

Blechman, B. & T. C. Wittes (1999): "Defining Moment: The Threat and Use of Force in American Foreign Policy", Political Science Quarterly 114. s. 1-30 (30 s.).

Bueno de Mesquita, B. & D. Lalman (1992): War and Reason, New Haven: Yale University Press.

Butler, C. K., & Gates, S. (2012). African range wars: Climate, conflict, and property rights. Journal of Peace Research, 49(1), 23-34.

Downs, G. W. (1989): "The Rational Deterrence Debate", World Politics 41. s. 225-237.

Downs, G. W. & D. M. Rocke (1990): Tacit Bragaining, Arms Races and Arms Control, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Drezner, D. (1999): The Sanctions Paradox: Economic Statecraft and International Relations, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Drezner, D. (2000): “Bargaining, Enforcement, and Multilateral Sanctions: When Is Cooperation Counterproductive?”, International Organization 54. s. 73-102.

Drezner, D. (2003): "The Hidden Hand of Economic Coercion", International Organization 57:643-59 (17p)

Fearon, James D. (1998). “Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation,” International Organization 52(2): 269 – 305.

Fearon, James D. (2002). “Selection Effects and Deterrence,” International Interactions 28:1, 5-29.

Gambetta, Diego, ed. (2005): Making Sense of Suicide Missions, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Gates, S. & B. D. Humes (1997): Games, Information and Politics. Applying Game Theoretic Models to Political Science, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Hargreaves Heap, S. & Y. Varoufakis (1994): Game Theory. A Critical Introduction, London: Routledge.

Hirschleifer, J. (1985): "The Economic Approach to Conflict", Working Paper no. 320A, UCLA Department of Economics.

Hirshleifer, Jack (2001): The Dark Side of the Force. Economic Foundations of Conflict Theory, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hovi, J. (2009): Spillteori, Universitetsforlaget.

Hovi, J. & B. E. Rasch (1993): Strategisk handling. Innf?ring i bruk av rasjonalitetsmodeller og spillteori, Oslo: Universitetsforlaget.

Jervis, R. (1989): "Rational Deterrence: Theory and Evidence", World Politics 41. s. 183-207.

Kilgour, Marc D. and Frank C. Zagare. (1991). “Credibility, Uncertainty, and Deterrence“, American Journal of Political Science. 35( 2 ) 305-334.

Kraig, M. R. (1999): ”Nuclear Deterrence in the Developing World: A Game-theoretic Treatment”, Journal of Peace Research 36. s. 141-167.

Lake, D. (2003): Rationalist Extremism: Understanding Terrorism in the Twenty-first Century, Dialogue-IO, Spring 2002: 15-29 15p.

Lebow, R. N. & J. G. Stein (1989): "Rational Deterrence Theory: I Think, Therefore I Deter", World Politics 41. s. 208-224.

McGinnis, M. (1992): "Bridging or Broadening the Gap?", Journal of Theoretical Politics 4. s. 443-457.

Morrow, J. D. (1994): Game Theory for Political Scientists, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. (?vrige kapitler).

Nalebuff, B. (1991): "Rational Deterrence in an Imperfect World", World Politics 43. s. 313-335.

Nicholson, M. (1989): Formal Theories in International Relations, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Nicholson, M. (1992): Rationality and the Analysis of International Conflict, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Niou, E. M. S. & P. C. Ordeshook (1994): "A Game-Theoretic Interpretation of Sun Tzu's The Art of War", Journal of Peace Research 31. s. 161-174 .

O'Neill, B. (1992): "Are Game Models of Deterrence Biased Towards Arms-Building?", Journal of Theoretical Politics 4. 459-477.

Petersen, W. (1986): "Deterrence and Compellence: A Critical Assessment of Conventional Wisdom", International Studies Quarterly 30. s. 269-294.

Powell, Robert (1991): "Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory", American Political Science Review 85(4). 1303–1320.

Powell, Robert (1999): In the Shadow of Power, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Rapoport, A. (1992): "Comments on 'Rationality and Misperceptions in Deterrence Theory'" , Journal of Theoretical Politics 4. s. 479-484.