Disse b?kene kan kj?pes p? Akademika:
Axelrod, R.: The Evolution of Cooperation
Barrett, S.: Environment & Statecraft
Resten av artiklene er samlet i tre kompendier som er klare i Kopiutsalget.
Pensum
Axelrod, R.: The Evolution of Cooperation, 1984. New York: Basic Books. . Kap. 1-4, 6. 105s.
Barrett, S.: Environment & Statecraft. The Strategy of Environmental Treaty-Making, 2003. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Kap. 1,2,4,6 (unntatt appendix),9,11. 129s.
Barrett, S. & R. Stavins: Increasing Participation and Compliance in International Climate Change Agreements, 2003. International Environmental agreements: Politics, Law and Economics 3(4).. 28s.
Dawes, R.M. & R.H. Thaler: Anomalies: Cooperation, 1988. Journal of Economic Perspectives 2:187-197. 11s.
Elster, J.: Solomonic Judgements, 1989. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kap. 1. 35s..
Gates, S. & B. Humes: Games, Information, and Politics: Applying Game Theoretic Models to Politics, 1997. Ann Arbor: Michigan University Press. Kap. 1-2. 60s.
Grieco, J., R. Powell & D. Snidal: The Relative Gains Problem for International Cooperation, 1993. American Political Science Review 87:729-743. 15s.
Hovi, J.: Spillmodeller og internasjonalt 亚博娱乐官网_亚博pt手机客户端登录: Motiver, mekanismer og institusjoner, 1992. Upublisert doktoravhandling. Kap. 1-9, 11. 183s.
Hovi, J.: Games, Threats and Treaties. Understanding Commitments in International Relations, 1998. London: Pinter. Kap. 5-9. 70s.
Hovi, J.: The Pros and Cons of External Enforcement, 2004. in Stokke O.S., J. Hovi & G. Ulfstein (eds.), International Compliance: Implementing the Climate Regime. 20s.
Hovi, J.: International Cooperation, Decision Rules and The Joint- Decision Trap: The Limits of the Law of the Least Ambitious Program, 2000. Upublisert notat. 22s.
Hovi, J. & I. Areklett: Enforcing the Climate Regime: Game Theory and the Marrakesh Accords, 2004. International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics 4(1).. 25s.
M?stad, O.: Milj?kritikken mot GATT/WTO - holder den?, 1998. Oslo: Norsk Utenrikspolitisk Institutt. s. 127-137 i A. Melchior & V. Norman 1998, Fra GATT til WTO. Handelspolitiske utfordringer ved GATTs 50-?rsjubileum. 11s.
Patchen, M.: Strategies for Eliciting Cooperation from an Adversary. Laboratory and Inter-nation Findings, 1987. Journal of Conflict Resolution 31:164-185. 21s.
Powell, R.: Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory, 1991. American Political Science Review 85:1303-1320. 17s.
Snidal, D.: Relative Gains and the Pattern of International Cooperation, 1991. American Political Science Review 85:701-726. 26s.
Taylor, M.: When Rationality Fails, 1996. New Haven: Yale University Press. s. 223-234 i J. Friedman (red.), The Rational Choice Controversy. 12s.
Yarbrough, B.V & R.M. Yarbrough: Reciprocity, Bilateralism and Economic 'Hostages': Self-enforcing agreements in International Trade, 1986. International Studies Quarterly 30:7-21. 14s.
Totalt 791 sider
Anbefalt litteratur
Barnaby, F. (red.): A Handbook of Verification Procedures, 1990. London: MacMillan.
Barrett, S.: Environment & Statecraft. The Strategy of Environmental Treaty-Making, 2003. Oxford: Oxford University Press (?vrige kapitler).
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Chong, D.: Reputation and Cooperative Behaviour, 1992. Social Science Information .
Cornes, R. & T. Sandler: The Theory of Externalities, Public Goods and Club Goods, 1986. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Dawes, R.M., J.M. Orbell, R.T. Simmons & A.J.C. van de Kragt: Organizing Groups for Collective Action, 1986. American Political Science Review 80:1171-1185..
Dixit, A.K. & B.J. Nalebuff: Thinking Strategically, 1991. New York: W.W. Norton.
Downs, G.W. & D.M. Rocke: Tacit Bargaining, Arms Races, and Arms Control, 1990. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Erev, I. & A. Rapoport: Provision of Step-Level Public Goods. The Sequential Contribution Mechanism, 1990. Journal of Conflict Resolution 34:401-425.
Fearon, J.: Bargaining, Enforcement and International Cooperation, 1998. International Organization 52:269-305.
Gray, C.S.: Does Verification Really Matter? Political Facts about Arms Control Non-Compliance, 1990. Strategic Review (spring 1990):32-42.
Hargreaves Heap, S & Y. Varoufakis: Game Theory: A Critical Introduction, 1995. London: Routledge.
Helland, L. & J. Hovi: Bayesiansk oppdatering og spill med ufullstendig informasjon, 1996. 亚博娱乐官网_亚博pt手机客户端登录srapport nr. 1/1996. Oslo: Institutt for statsvitenskap. Kap. 7. 10s.
Hovi, J. & B.E. Rasch: Strategisk handling, 1993. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget. Kapittel 1-8.
Hovi, J. & B.E. Rasch: Samfunnsvitenskapelige Analyseprinsipper, 1996. Bergen: Fagbokforlaget.
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Iida, K.: When and how do domestic constraints matter – two-level games with uncertainty, 1993. Journal of Conflict Resolution 37:403-426. 24s.
Kydd, A.: Trust, Reassurance, and Cooperation, 2000. International Organization 54:325-357.
Morrow, J.: Game Theory for Political Scientists, Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press.
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Ostrom, E.: Governing the Commons, 1990. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Oye, K.A. (red.): Cooperation under Anarchy, 1987. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Payne, D.C.: Policy-making in Nested Institutions: Explaining the Conservation Failure of the EU’s Common Fisheries Policy, 2000. Journal of Common Market Studies 38:303-24.
Powell, R.: Anarchy in International Relations Theory: The Neorealist-Neoliberal Debate, 1994. International Organization 48:313-44.
Rasmusen, E.: Games and Information. An Introduction to Game Theory, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Rubinstein, A.: Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model, 1982. Econometrica 50:97-110.
Stein, A.A.: Why Nations Cooperate. Circumstance and Choice in International Relations, 1990. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press. Kap. 1-3. 84s.
Sugden, R.: The Economics of Rights, Co-operation and Welfare, 1986. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Sutton, J.: Non-Cooperative bargaining Theory, 1986. Review of Economic Studies 53:709-724.
Tarar, A.: International bargaining with two-sided domestic constraints, 2001. Journal of Conflict Resolution 45:320-340. 26s.
Taylor, M.: The Possibility of Cooperation, 1987. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Taylor, M. & H. Ward: Chickens, Whales, and Lumpy Goods: Alternative Models of Public Goods Provision, 1982. Political Studies 30:351-370.
Tsebelis, G.: Nested Games. Rational Choice in Comparative Politics, 1990. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Underdal, A.: International Cooperation: Transforming Needs into Deeds, 1987. Journal of Peace Research 24:167-183.
Underdal, A.: Patterns of Effectiveness: Examining Evidence from 13 International Regimes, Paper prepared for presentation at the 38th Convention of the International Studies Association, Toronto, 19-22 March, 1997.
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