Books and compendiums can be bought in Akademika bookstore at Blindern campus. You will need a valid semester card to buy compendiums.
Compendium
Hovi, J (1998). Games, Threats and Treaties. Understanding Commitments in International Relations. London: Pinter. Kap. 1, 2, 5-9.
Steunenberg, B. & A. Dimitrova (2007). “Compliance in the EU Enlargement Process: Institutional Reform and the Limits of Conditionality”, in A. Marciano & J-M. Josselin (eds.): Democracy, Freedom and Coercion. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Kompendium
Taylor, M. (1996). "When Rationality Fails", in J. Friedman (ed.), The Rational Choice Controversy. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Online articles
Aakre, S., L. Helland & J. Hovi (2016). “When Does Informal Enforcement Work?” Journal of Conflict Resolution 60 (7): 1312-1340. http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0022002714560349
Bulmer, S. & L. Quaglia 2018. “The Politics and Economics of Brexit”, Journal of European Public Policy 25 (8): 1089-1098. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13501763.2018.1467957
Cherry, T., S. Kallbekken, S. Kroll & D. McEvoy (2013). “Cooperation in and out of Markets: An Experimental Comparison of Public Good Games and Markets with Externalities”, Economics Letters 120 (1): 93-96. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165176513001432
Climate Focus 2015. The Paris Agreement: Summary. https://climatefocus.com/sites/default/files/20151228%20COP%2021%20briefing%20FIN.pdf
Dawes, R.M. & R.H. Thaler (1988). “Anomalies: Cooperation”, Journal of Economic Perspectives 2 (3): 187-197. http://econ.ucsb.edu/~oprea/176/Cooperation.pdf
Downs, G.W. (1997) “Enforcement and the Evolution of Cooperation”, Mich. Journal of International Law 19 (1): 319-344. https://repository.law.umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1442&context=mjil
Frank, R.H., T. Gilovich & D.T. Regan (1993). “Does Studying Economics Inhibit Cooperation?” Journal of Economic Perspectives 7 (2): 159-171. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2138205?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents
Grieco, J., R. Powell & D. Snidal (1993). “The Relative Gains Problem for International Cooperation”, American Political Science Review 87 (3): 729-743. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2938747?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents
Grundig, F. (2006). “Patterns of International Cooperation and the Explanatory Power of Relative Gains: An Analysis of Cooperation on Global Climate Change, Ozone Depletion, and International Trade”, International Studies Quarterly 50 (4): 781-801. http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/4092779
Grundig, F., J. Hovi, A. Underdal & S. Aakre (2012). “Self-enforcing Peace and Environmental Agreements. Toward Scholarly Cross-fertilization?” International Studies Review 14 (4): 522- 540. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/misr.12003/pdf
Hovi, J. (1986). “Binary Games as Models of Public Goods Provision”, Scandinavian Political Studies 9 (4):337-360. https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1467-9477.1986.tb00354.x
Hovi, J. & I. Areklett (2004). “Enforcing the Climate Regime: Game Theory and the Marrakesh Accords”, International Environmental Agreements 4 (1): 1-26. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1023/B:INEA.0000019026.02330.da
Hovi, J., M. Greaker, C. Hagem & B. Holtsmark (2012). “A Credible Compliance Enforcement System for the Climate Regime”, Climate Policy 12 (6): 741-754. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14693062.2012.692206
Hvidsten, A. & J. Hovi (2015). “Why No Twin-track Europe? Unity, Discontent and Differentiation in European Integration”, European Union Politics 16 (1): 3-22. http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1465116514557964
Kanbur, R. (2006) “The Economics of International Aid”, in Handbook of the Economics of Giving, Altruism and Reciprocity, p. 1559-1588.
McGillivray, F. & A. Smith (2000). “Trust and Cooperation through Agent-specific Punishments”, International Organization 54 (4): 809-824. https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/international-organization/article/trust-and-cooperation-through-agentspecific-punishments/5A2A34A91407016BEAD9F48296959BC0
Morrow, J. D. (1994). “Modeling the Forms of International Cooperation: Distribution vs. Information”, International Organization 48 (3): 387-423. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2706964?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents
Powell, R. (1991) “Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory”, American Political Science Review 85 (4): 1303-1320. https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-political-science-review/article/absolute-and-relative-gains-in-international-relations-theory/0018BA1A141FE29A522EEDAA2A75826E
Snidal, D. (1991) “Relative Gains and the Pattern of International Cooperation”, American Political Science Review 85 (3):701-726. https://www.jstor.org/stable/1963847?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents
Tallberg, J. (2002) “Paths to Compliance: Enforcement, Management, and the European Union”, International Organization 56 (3): 609-643. https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/international-organization/article/paths-to-compliance-enforcement-management-and-the-european-union/588E27F7E8D14769858B4CE33515E470
Urpelainen, J. (2010). “Enforcement and Capacity Building in International Cooperation”, International Theory 2 (1): 32-49. https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/international-theory/article/enforcement-and-capacity-building-in-international-cooperation/88D50FF775A2F4B85EC7652F53A93F39
Yarbrough, B.V & R.M. Yarbrough (1986). “Reciprocity, Bilateralism and Economic 'Hostages': Self-enforcing Agreements in International Trade”, International Studies Quarterly 30 (1): 7-21. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2600434?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents